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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the global undersea cable infrastructure as it pertains to international 
telecommunications.  We represent countries, cable landing stations, and undersea cables 
using a network structure of nodes and edges that closely imitates the real-world system.  
For a given geographic region, we connect individual networks associated with stand-
alone cable systems to create one large network model.  We use a “gravity model” to 
estimate the traffic demand between each pair of countries based on the number of 
Internet hosts in each country.  We formulate and solve an Attacker-Defender (AD) 
model to identify the worst-case disruptions, where a “worst-case” disruption 
corresponds to the greatest shortage in telecommunications traffic even after the system 
has rebalanced flows as best as possible.  Using public sources of data, we collect 
information about more than 220 real cable systems, and we develop a customized 
decision support tool that facilitates the analysis of different combinations of countries 
and cable systems.  We demonstrate our modeling technique with an analysis of the 
undersea cable infrastructure connecting Europe and India.  Our analysis provides insight 
into which components in the system are most vulnerable along with how effectively the 
system performs in the face of disruptions.                
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 This thesis analyzes the global undersea cable infrastructure as it pertains to 
international telecommunications.  We examine the resilience of this infrastructure to 
worst-case disruptions, where a “worst-case” disruption corresponds to the greatest 
shortage in telecommunications traffic even after the system has rebalanced flows as best 
as possible.  This analysis provides insight into which components in the system are most 
vulnerable along with how effectively the system performs in the face of disruptions. 
We represent countries, cable landing stations, and undersea cables using a 
network structure of nodes and edges that closely imitates the real-world system.  For a 
given geographic region, we connect individual networks associated with stand-alone 
cable systems to create one large network.  We use a “gravity model” to estimate the 
traffic demand between each pair of countries based on the number of Internet hosts in 
each country.  We use Attacker-Defender (AD) modeling techniques to determine where 
the worst-case disruptions occur and how the system responds in the face of disruptions.  
Using public sources of data, we collect information about more than 220 real cable 
systems, and we develop a customized decision support tool that facilitates the analysis of 
different combinations of countries and cable systems.  We demonstrate our modeling 
technique with an analysis of the undersea cable infrastructure connecting Europe and 
India. 
 Our results provide insight into this specific infrastructure and also suggest 
broader implications regarding undersea cable infrastructures in general.  First, a 
country’s transoceanic communications may be severely degraded without disruptions to 
any cables or landing stations that are actually in or near that country.  Second, we 
highlight the important role that redundancy plays in determining the resilience of an 
undersea cable infrastructure.  Specifically, we show that redundancy must exist in the 
form of both capacity redundancy and physical redundancy in order to ensure resilience 




plays a major role in the resilience on an undersea cable infrastructure.  Natural choke 
points and other system limitations imposed by physical geography often represent the 
most vulnerable locations for disruption.     
Our model and analysis could easily be adapted to address scenarios of interest to 
the Department of Defense by focusing on specific cable systems of interest and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Two of the most influential innovations of the latter 20th century are the Internet 
and mobile phones.  In 1994, during the nascent stages of both these technologies, there 
were fewer than 20 million Internet users and 55 million mobile-cellular subscriptions 
worldwide.  By the end of 2011, there were over 2 billion Internet users and almost 6 
billion mobile-cellular subscriptions worldwide (ITU, 2011).  In less than two decades, 
these technologies went from virtually non-existent to being a ubiquitous part of 
everyday life.  Still, most people who use the Internet and mobile phones every day give 
little thought to the underlying physical infrastructure that enables near-instantaneous 
communication on a global scale.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The global undersea cable infrastructure is a physical system of optical fiber 
cables connecting all of the world’s continents with the exception of Antarctica.  
According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), these undersea cables 
carry over 95 percent of international voice and data traffic (ICPC, 2011).  Indeed, 
undersea telecommunications cables, along with their terrestrial counterparts, form the 
backbone of the information superhighway.   
1. Historic Growth 
Historically, transcontinental communications cables progressed across three 
fairly distinct eras:  telegraph cables (1850–1960), coaxial telephone cables (1956–1990), 
and optical fiber cables (1988–present).  The first transoceanic telegraph cable was laid 
between Ireland and Newfoundland in 1858 and used electricity and Morse code to send 
messages.  That first cable only transmitted a single word per minute.  Today, the 
delivery capacity of a single cable is in the terabits per second with the capability of 
carrying millions of simultaneous telephone calls along with large amounts of video and 
Internet data (Chesnoy, 2002).  Figure 1 illustrates the exponential growth in the capacity 
of submarine cables over the years as the technology changed from telegraph to coaxial 
telephone to digital fiber.  As the conduit for global communications and the Internet, 
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submarine optical fiber cables have helped revolutionize business, commerce, 
communications, education, and entertainment.  The ownership, maintenance, protection, 
and usage-rights associated with each of these systems are often very complicated, 
involving national governments, global agencies, and a multitude of private enterprises.  
The Pan American Cable System, for example, was launched in 1996 by a consortium of 
41 different telecommunications carriers from 27 countries (Trischitta et al., 1997).    
 
 
Figure 1.   Capacity of undersea telecommunications cables over the years (From 
Alwis, 2007). 
In the mid to late 1900s as the United States and the former Soviet Union 
vigorously competed in space exploration as a symbolic backdrop to the Cold War, it 
appeared that satellite technology would forever dominate global communications.  In 
1988, artificial satellites were the primary carrier with undersea cables accounting for 
only two percent of the world’s transoceanic flow of communications (Mandell, 2000).  
However, the development of optical fiber digital technology altered that trend seemingly 
overnight.  The first transoceanic optical fiber submarine cable system Trans-Atlantic 
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Telephone 8 (TAT-8) came into service in 1988 with “more capacity in a single cable 
than the combined capacity of all the transatlantic cables” in existence at the time 
(Beaufils, 2000).  And while the latest optical fiber cables have more than 3000 times the 
capacity of their coaxial predecessors, “today’s satellites have improved only modestly 
over theirs” (Mandell, 2000).  In addition to their overwhelming advantage in capacity, 
submarine cables are also superior to satellites in signal quality, transmission speed, 
confidentiality, and service lifetime among other factors (Beaufils, 2000).  Table 1 
compares satellites and submarine optical fiber cables according to several key factors.   
 
Comparison Factor Satellite Optical Subsea 
Latency 250 milliseconds 50 milliseconds 
Design life 10-15 years 25 years 
Capacity 48,000 channels 160,000,000 channels 
Unit cost per Mbps capacity $737,316 US $14,327 US 
Share of traffic: 1995 50% 50% 
Share of traffic: 2008 3% 97% 
Table 1.   Comparison of satellite versus undersea optical fiber cables across several 
key factors in telecommunications (Adapted from Donovan, 2009). 
Satellites are still viable, particularly in one-to-many transmissions such as 
television broadcasts and satellite radio.  They also provide critical access to remote 
locations.  However, in the case of one-to-one transmissions between countries and 
continents, submarine cables clearly dominate the current landscape.  According to 
Beaufils (2000), this dominance will expand with the advent of the next generation of the 
Internet and the increasing demand for bandwidth.  In addition to e-mail and data 
browsing, the Internet now supports many more services including video and HDTV, 
Internet voice, file transfer, remote computing, video-conferencing, and networked 
devices such as smartphones and tablets along with many other multimedia applications 
such as 3DTV still yet to come.  As a result, the global undersea communications 
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infrastructure continues to expand at a prolific pace.  Today there are hundreds of 
undersea cable systems with new systems and upgrades continuing to be installed.  Figure 
2 shows a map of all the undersea optical fiber cable systems currently in existence. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Map of undersea optical fiber cable systems worldwide (From 
Telegeography, 2012a). 
2. How Undersea Cables Work 
The principal components of a modern submarine optical fiber cable system 
include the cables themselves, repeaters, branching units, power feed equipment (PFE), 
and terminal equipment.  Figure 3 depicts the working relationship among these 
components.    
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Figure 3.   Principal components of a modern undersea optical fiber cable system 
(From Letellier, 2004). 
The cables themselves are designed on a fiber-pair basis to support bidirectional traffic.  
Modern cables contain as many as eight fiber pairs.  Since the signal is degraded as it 
travels along the cable, the system needs repeaters that effectively boost the signal at 
regular intervals along the length of the cable.  Repeaters are typically located at intervals 
of approximately 50 to 110 kilometers apart (Letellier, 2004).  In the first optical fiber 
cables, repeaters converted the optical signals back to the electrical domain for 
reamplification of the signal and then converted the signal back to the optical domain 
before sending it along the path.  However, today’s cable systems are optically amplified 
so that the signal remains photonic throughout the transmission path (Beaufils, 2000).  
The branching units often serve as repeaters themselves while also allowing for undersea 
fiber connections.  The PFE supply electrical current to the repeaters to support the 
reamplification process.  Finally, the terminal equipment sends and receives the signals 
and interfaces with terrestrial cable systems.  Recent advancements in wavelength-
division multiplexing (WDM) have increased the capacity for sending and receiving 
traffic even more dramatically.  WDM technology allows the simultaneous transmission 
of multiple optical signals on a single optical fiber by using different wavelengths (i.e., 
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colors) of laser light (Beaufils, 2000).  Thus, an already established cable can be 
upgraded in capacity without actually adding additional fiber pairs to the cable.  It only 
requires upgrading the terminal equipment to support the latest WDM technology.  
According to Letellier (2004), the latest terminal line equipment set-ups using WDM 
technology allow more than 100 optical channels at 10 gigabits per second (Gbps) on 
each channel.  The newest undersea cables currently being constructed contain as many 
as eight fiber pairs and 128 optical channels on each fiber pair via WDM.  With 10 Gbps 
per optical channel, the total potential capacity now exceeds 10 terabits per second (Tbps) 
on a single undersea cable.  At that capacity, one cable “can carry approximately 160 
million telephone circuits simultaneously or transfer approximately 272 DVD disks” 
between continents in about one second (FSSCC, 2009).                 
The network topology of each submarine cable system is uniquely designed to 
meet the particular needs of the system.  Network topologies refer to both the physical 
and logical configuration of the cable system.  In general, the physical topology relates to 
the undersea cable itself while the logical topology relates to the individual fiber pairs 
within the cable.  The four basic physical configurations commonly employed are string, 
branched string, ring, and mesh (Beaufils, 2000).  Often a single cable system will 
incorporate a mix of these designs.  Figure 4 illustrates the basic physical topologies.  
The newest cable systems typically employ ring or mesh configurations because of their 
self-healing nature; a single cable cut does not sever any of the nodes from the network, 
and, assuming that sufficient capacity exists, the network can restore all traffic through 




Figure 4.   Basic physical topologies of undersea optical fiber cable systems. 
The logical topology determines how the data is actually transmitted inside the network.  
Branching units provide tremendous flexibility in the routing of each fiber pair.  Network 
operators maximize the transmission capacity between preferred routes through efficient 
logical configurations.  The logical topology of several current submarine cable systems 
is shown in Figure 5.  While the physical configuration of almost every submarine cable 
system is readily available via public source data, the logical configuration along with the 
quantity and location of branching units are rarely disclosed by cable owners and 
operators.  The network topology, including both the physical and logical design, is 
critical to the overall performance and resilience of an undersea cable system.         
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Figure 5.   Logical topology of several current undersea optical fiber cable systems 
(After: Trischitta & Marra, 1998). 
3. Impact of Disruptions 
Undersea cables are susceptible to disruption from both deliberate threats (e.g., 
terrorism, piracy, sabotage) and non-deliberate hazards (e.g., failure, accident, natural 
disaster).  In terms of physical security, the optical fiber cables themselves are sheathed 
in protective armor coatings made of high-strength steel and other synthetic materials but 
still only measure around 20–50 millimeters in diameter (ICPC, 2011).  For further 
protection, the cables are typically buried in yard-deep trenches.  However, they are 
usually left to run uncovered along the ocean floor in water depths exceeding 1,000 feet.  
Among non-deliberate hazards, trawl fishing and ship anchors are common disruptions.  




frequently but typically affect multiple cables.  Considering these natural and man-made 
obstacles they sometimes face, the garden hose-sized undersea cables are a relatively 
“soft” target in the ocean environment.   
Major disruptions over the last several years have resulted in massive economic 
losses in terms of both repair costs and down time.  According to the ICPC around 70 
percent of all cable faults are caused by fishing and anchoring activities (ICPC, 2011).  In 
2007, Australia became one of the only countries to establish protection zones that 
prohibit fishing and anchoring activities around undersea cables (ACMA, 2007).  Natural 
hazards, on the other hand, have much lower incidence rates than fishing and anchoring 
but usually result in far more severe economic consequences.  The 2006 Hengchun 
earthquake along the southern coast of Taiwan triggered submarine landslides over large 
areas of the ocean floor and broke nine undersea cables in the process (ICPC, 2009).  
Internet telecommunications linking China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Japan, and the Philippines were seriously impaired.  Cable repairs lasted around two 
months.  During that time most traffic was successfully re-routed but with significant 
delays.  In regards to deliberate threats, in 2007 off the coast of Vietnam piracy was 
blamed in the theft of active submarine cables and equipment (ICPC, 2009).  In early 
2008 over the span of just a few days, multiple undersea cables were cut off the coasts of 
Egypt and Dubai.  At the time these cables collectively accounted for around three-
quarters of the international communications between Europe, North Africa, the Middle 
East, and India.  As a result, at least 14 countries lost a significant amount of 
connectivity.  In particular, more than 80 percent of India’s international service went 
down, while Maldives was entirely disconnected from the outside world (Sechrist, 
2010a).  While damage to undersea cables is common, the short time span and limited 
geographic area of these cuts raised troubling suspicions.  Although there have been no 
confirmed cases of terrorism or sabotage to submarine cables, the overall security and 
vulnerability of the global undersea cable infrastructure remains questionable.    
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B. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on assessing resilience in the global undersea cable 
infrastructure as it pertains to international telecommunications.  In this thesis, we define 
resilience as the capability of a system to maintain its functions in the face of internal and 
external events; this definition is consistent with that of the Critical Infrastructure Task 
Force (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2006) and the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (Homeland Security Council, 2007).  We represent countries, cable 
landing stations, and undersea cables using a network structure of nodes and edges that 
closely imitates the real-world system.  We formulate a mathematical model of the 
normal daily flow of international telecommunications traffic.  This model of normal 
operations gives us an appreciation of the complexity of the global undersea cable 
infrastructure.   
By adding the effect of cable loss to this model, we investigate the vulnerabilities 
of the global undersea cable infrastructure.  We look at attacks against the cables 
themselves and attacks against cable landing stations.  We also consider worst-case 
disruptions in regards to multiple simultaneous attacks.  We define a worst-case 
disruption to mean a disruption that causes the greatest shortage in telecommunications 
traffic.    Our analysis provides insight as to which components are most critical to the 
system.   
When analyzing undersea telecommunications cables, both the physical security 
of the cable infrastructure along with the virtual security of the information being 
transmitted are important.  Our analysis focuses on the physical security of the 
infrastructure.  In other words, we consider attacks on physical components that could 
interrupt communications flow.  We do not consider attacks against the data integrity of 
these flows such as from surveillance or interception of telephone or data traffic.  Our 
geographic scope encompasses the world-wide system of undersea cables including all 
known cables currently in existence.   
In this thesis, we make the simplifying assumption that the multitude of cable 
systems function collectively as if operated by a single, centralized decision maker.  We 
 11 
assume that link capacities are easily shared to transmit traffic as needed.  In the event of 
failures, we assume that the network utilizes all available resources to reroute traffic in an 
optimal manner.  We do not consider the details of routing protocols and shared 
ownership agreements required to make this all possible.  With these assumptions we 
likely overestimate the ability of the network to transmit information and handle failures, 
but the results provide an upper bound on the network’s ability to do so, and they 
therefore yield an optimistic estimate of the impact of attacks or disruptions on the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We review three main topic areas in the academic literature that give context to 
this thesis.  The first area of research is analyzing and modeling disruptions to the global 
undersea cable infrastructure.  The second area of research is the use of gravity models 
for estimating unknown parameters.  The final area of research is the Attacker-Defender 
(AD) style of modeling developed at the Naval Postgraduate School.   
A. GLOBAL UNDERSEA CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE 
Masi, Smith, and Fischer (2010) analyze the effects of natural and man-made 
disasters on both terrestrial and undersea optical fiber cable systems.  They argue that a 
single cut to an optical fiber communications cable typically has little impact since the 
communications may be rerouted through alternative cables.  However, they note that 
multiple simultaneous cuts, especially with undersea cables, may result in significant 
damage.  The ability to reroute communications diminishes with each successive cable 
that is cut.   
Collins (2011) highlights the importance of redundancy in undersea cable 
systems.  He examines how Japan’s communications infrastructure performed in the face 
of the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that occurred there in early 2011.  He notes 
that throughout the disaster, Japan sustained their international communications 
capabilities which allowed them to coordinate assistance from other countries in the 
emergency response and recovery efforts.  Collins attributes that success to the 
redundancy gained by routing undersea cables in separate undersea trenches and bringing 
them ashore at different cable landing stations.    
Omer, Nilchiani, and Mostashari (2009) measure the resilience of the global 
undersea cable infrastructure using network modeling.  Their network model is highly 
aggregated.  The nodes in the network represent major geographic regions of the world, 
of which they use eight total.  Further, a single undirected edge between two nodes in 
their model represents the collection of all existing submarine cables passing between the 
two nodes.  For example, the edge between North America and Europe represents the 
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combined flows and capacities of all submarine cables connecting those two regions.  
There are 12 total edges in their model.  Their model demonstrates a broad-scale 
approach with possible applications to similar networked infrastructure systems.  They 
define the “value delivery” of the infrastructure as the total amount of information that is 
carried through the network.  They measure resiliency as the ratio of the value delivery of 
the system after a disruption to the value delivery of the system before the disruption.  
Finally, their article also highlights the critical importance of rerouting and redundant 
capacities for a more resilient communications infrastructure.    
Sechrist (2010b) uses an analytic framework based on a “Danger Index” to 
determine a risk assessment for the global undersea cable infrastructure as a whole.  The 
“Danger Index” is defined as the product of Intention, Capability, Vulnerability, and 
Consequence.  Intention refers to the intent of those causing damage to cables, whether 
malicious or benign.  Capability refers to the knowledge, skills, and special tools required 
to purposefully damage undersea cables.  Vulnerability is assessed based on qualitative 
factors such as cable route diversity, physical security of cables and cable landing 
stations, and whether or not cables lie in fault-prone earthquake zones.  Consequence 
refers to the size, duration, and economic costs associated with cable disruptions.  
Sechrist demonstrates that the four variables of the equation are all increasing, and 
subsequently concludes that the global undersea cable architecture is at an increased risk 
of danger.  He provides a number of policy recommendations to lower the “Danger 
Index” for the undersea cable infrastructure including hardening of facilities, prioritizing 
traffic, encouraging cable protection zones, and creating disaster recovery plans.         
B. GRAVITY MODELS 
As described by Chang et al. (2006), gravity models take their name from 
Newton’s law of gravitation, and are commonly used by social scientists to model or 
estimate the flow of people, goods, or information between geographic areas.  In 
Newton’s law of gravitation the force is proportional to the product of the masses of the 
two objects divided by the distance squared.  Similarly, gravity models use readily 
available data such as population statistics (or other surrogate) and distances between 
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cities to develop the intensity for pair-wise interactions, such as volume of traffic flow.  
However, as Chang et al. (2006) point out, locality is not as large a factor in Internet 
traffic as with the transport of physical goods.  In their gravity model of Internet traffic, 
the traffic exchanged between two locations is proportional to the volumes entering and 
exiting at those locations.  More specifically, they denote network nodes by ni, i = 1, …, 
k, and the traffic matrix by T, where T(i, j) denotes the volume of traffic that enters the 
network at node ni and exits at node nj.  Let Tin(i) and Tout(j) denote the total traffic that 
enters the network via node ni, and exits the network via node nj, respectively.  The 
gravity model is then computed by  
( ) ( )( , ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
in out
tot tot in out
in out
k k
T i T jT i j T T p i p j




where Ttot is the total traffic across the network, and pin(i) and pout(j) denote the 
proportion of traffic entering and exiting the network at nodes i and j respectively.  For 
this model, then, we still need to know the total volume of traffic that enters and exits at 
each node or else the total traffic across the entire network along with some good 
estimators for the probabilities of traffic entering and exiting at each location.  Gravity 
models such as this are particularly useful, necessary in fact, when actual or historical 
data is either unavailable or too expensive to gather.   
Omer, Nilchiani, and Mostashari (2009) use a simpler gravity model to 
approximate traffic demand in their network model of the global undersea cable 
infrastructure.  For each node, they calculate the demand by multiplying the number of 
internet users by the average content downloaded per person per day.  As a result, they 
have a demand value for traffic at each node.  However, they do not explicitly state how 
that demand is proportioned from among the other nodes.  Rather, the percentages of that 
demand coming from the various others nodes are assumed.       
Nandi, Vasarhelyi, and Ahn (2000) also present a gravity model for estimating the 
flow of Internet traffic between countries.  Their model is primarily based on the theory 
of network externality.  Specifically, they assume that the flow of traffic among different 
countries is directly linked with the number of Internet hosts in those countries.  The state 
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of Internet connectivity among different countries is implicitly incorporated into their 
model by using this information on the number of hosts.  Admittedly, their model does 
not consider the role of language or cultural aspects in the flow of Internet traffic.  The 
mathematical formulation of their model is similar to the one used by Chang et al.  (2006) 
where the total traffic across the network is distributed among the different countries 
based on the probabilities of traffic entering or exiting the network at each country.  In 
the model by Nandi, Vasarhelyi, and Ahn (2000), those probabilities are effectively 
determined by the number of Internet hosts in each country.     
C. ATTACKER DEFENDER MODELING 
Brown et al. (2005, 2006) present a class of network interdiction models 
specifically tailored to critical infrastructure systems and the intelligent adversaries (i.e., 
terrorists) who threaten them.  These Attacker-Defender (AD) models use bi-level and 
tri-level optimization to pinpoint the most vulnerable components of an infrastructure, 
analyze worst-case scenarios, and identify optimal defense plans to enhance the resilience 
of the system.  They start by building an “operator’s model” which is a mathematical 
model of the normal, day-to-day operating realities of the infrastructure system.  This 
model prescribes the network flows that optimize system performance under idealized 
conditions.  The “attacker’s model” is built on the operator’s model.  In the “attacker’s 
model”, an intelligent adversary attacks the infrastructure where it causes maximum 
damage to system performance.  The capability of the attacker is adjusted to analyze 
various potential scenarios.  Finally, the “defender’s model” builds off the first two and 
allows the defender to mitigate disruptions by making strategic investments of limited 
resources for hardening, redundancy, or capacity expansion.  The development of AD 
models allows for the systematic identification of optimal defensive plans for 
infrastructure systems.   
Information transparency is a key assumption of the AD models.  In other words, 
the attacker has perfect knowledge of how the defender will (or should) optimally operate 
the system, even after an attack.  To demonstrate and test the AD style of modeling, 
Brown et al. (2005, 2006) often create hypothetical but realistic scenarios.  They 
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assemble “red” teams to gather strictly open-source data on the proposed infrastructure 
target.  The data gathered is used to inform the AD model, and it also helps with 
demonstrating just how easy it may be for potential terrorists to identify the 
vulnerabilities of a given infrastructure.  We apply the AD modeling techniques, 
including the use of strictly open-source data, in our analysis of the global undersea cable 
infrastructure.                  
D. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS IN CONTEXT 
We create the network structure and mathematical formulations to model the 
global undersea cable infrastructure.  We then superimpose simple graphs of each 
individual cable system onto the larger network one by one to create a large, complex 
network.  We analyze scenarios involving only a small number of specified countries and 
cables in a particular geographic region all the way up to scenarios involving all the 
cables in the world.  We present examples of such scenarios and demonstrate their 
implementation in our model.  Our approach follows directly from the AD modeling style 
developed by Brown et al. (2005, 2006) for the analysis of critical infrastructure systems.  
Our AD style of modeling contrasts with the risk-based approach used by Sechrist 
(2010b).  And while Omer, Nilchiani, and Mostashari (2009) represent the global 
undersea cable infrastructure as a network model, we build on their approach to achieve a 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps.  In the first step we develop a mathematical 
model of the undersea cable system as an Attacker-Defender (AD) model.  By running 
the model through a variety of scenarios, we gain insight into the critical components of 
the infrastructure along with potential worst-case disruptions in terms of multiple 
simultaneous attacks.  The second step in our model development is data collection.  This 
includes gathering the key information on the real-world cable systems including the 
configuration, landing stations, and capacity of each cable system.  We also develop a 
gravity model to estimate traffic demand between countries.  Finally, we build our 
network model by abstracting all of the currently existing undersea cable systems into 
individual graphs.  We introduce our network modeling approach with a specific 
example.     
A. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
We model the end-to-end information flows mathematically using a multi-
commodity (minimum-cost) network flow (MCNF) model.  The traffic demand between 
each pair of countries drives the flow in our mathematical model.  We measure network 
performance as the total cost to send all traffic through the network, with our goal being 
to satisfy the demand at minimum cost.  Each unit of unsatisfied demand is penalized by 
a shortage cost which may be different for each supply and demand location.  For 
example, the shortage cost for traffic lost from the United States to Israel may be higher 
than for traffic lost from South Africa to Singapore.  By changing the relative shortage 
costs for different supply-demand combinations, we can prioritize different end-to-end 
traffic flows. 
In order to ensure that flows are dropped only when there does not exist a feasible 
path through the network, we set the shortage cost for dropping one unit of flow to be 
larger than the cost of routing that unit along the longest possible path in the network.  
The longest possible path in the network can be defined as nC , where n N=  and 
max{ : ( , ) }ijC c i j A= ∈ .  We define commodities in our model in terms of their 
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destinations.  Specifically, we let tijY  denote the flow of traffic destined for node t  that 
travels over arc ( , )i j .  We let [ ]tsB b=  be the traffic matrix denoting the demand for 
traffic between all source-destination pairs s t− , where 0tsb >  represents the volume of 
traffic required to flow from node s  to node t s≠  in the network.  We also define 
t t
t ss tb b≠= −∑  as the total flow of traffic that enters the network at node t .  The remaining 
details of the model follow in three phases: the operator’s problem, the attacker’s 
problem, and solving the AD model.   
1. Operator’s Problem 
We develop the operator’s problem to determine the optimal flow under normal 
conditions.  The operator’s problem identifies the specific routes and quantities of flow 
on each route in order to satisfy demand at minimum cost.  The operator’s problem gives 
us a basic understanding of the flow of telecommunications traffic on a regular basis 
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The objective function (D0) includes the cost of routing flows to their destinations 
and the cost of any dropped flows.  Constraint (D1) enforces the balance of flow for each 
node 
Discussion 
s N∈  and each commodity destination ,t N t s∈ ≠ .  Constraint (D2) enforces the 
balance of flow for each commodity destination node t N∈ .  Constraint (D3) ensures the 
capacity on each arc is not exceeded.  Constraints (D4) and (D5) ensure all actual flows 
and dropped flows, respectively, are nonnegative. 
Solving the operator’s problem provides tremendous value, particularly in an 
industry where the demand often outpaces the capacity of the industry.  For example, 
consider a telecommunications carrier looking to expand but having a limited budget for 
expansion.  Suppose the choice is between constructing a new undersea cable from the  
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United States to Japan or a cable from India to Australia.  Running the operator’s 
problem for each proposed design easily reveals the extent to which those designs can 
meet the traffic demand.   
2. Attacker’s Problem 
In the attacker’s problem, we consider an intelligent adversary whose goal is to 
choose a set of arcs whose removal will create a worst-case disruption for the network 
operator.  An attack in our model corresponds to an undersea cable that is cut or 
otherwise disrupted.  We assume that each attack results in complete interdiction of flows 
traveling in both directions along the cable.  We also consider scenarios where the 
attacker chooses to attack cable landing stations effectively interdicting flow on all of the 
cables entering those landing stations.  To model the attacker’s actions, we introduce 
binary variables ijX  for each attackable arc ( , )i j .  We let 1ijX =  if the attacker chooses 
to interdict arc ( , )i j , and 0ijX =  otherwise.  We assume that the attacker is limited by 
the number of attacks he can conduct, denoted by the scalar attacks .  The remaining 
details of the attacker’s problem follow in the formulation.   
( , )i j B∈
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The objective function (A0) follows from the operator’s problem but now 
includes the attack variables, 
Discussion 
ijX , for each attackable arc.  If an arc is attacked, any flows 
along it incur an additional per-unit penalty cost ijp .  Since we assume that an attack on 
an arc means complete interdiction of that arc, we set the penalty cost for using attacked 
arcs to be greater than the shortage cost for unsatisfied demand.  The network will always 
drop flow rather than send flow over a more expensive, attacked arc.  Hence, attacked 
arcs are effectively impassable.  As a result, our model reflects the basic behavior of the 
real world system.  Constraints (D1) through (D5) are unchanged from the operator’s 
problem.  Constraint (A1) limits the number of interdictions allowed by the attacker.  
Constraint (A2) ensures that an attack on an arc in one direction results in an attack on 
that same arc in the opposite direction.  Modifying the scalar attacks  allows us to 
consider various scenarios relating to the attacker’s capability.  Finally, constraint (A3) 
implements the binary restriction on each attack variable.    
3. Solving the Attacker Defender Model 
The attacker’s problem is a bi-level max-min optimization problem.  The operator 
wants to minimize the cost of operating the system while the attacker seeks to maximize 
that minimum cost.  Unfortunately, this formulation is not a mixed integer linear program 
(MILP) and hence not easily solved using commercial integer linear programming 
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solvers.  To solve this formulation, we fix the attack variables and treat them as constants, 
then take the dual of the inner problem, and finally release the attack variables to produce 
a MILP which can be solved directly using commercial solvers.  The resulting 
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The objective function (AD0) to be maximized results from the dual of the inner 
problem in the attacker’s problem.  We have one dual variable, 
Discussion 
t
sα , for each node 
combination in the network and one dual variable, ijβ , for each arc in the network.  
These dual variables now serve as decision variables.  Their optimal solutions reflect the 
relative importance of the corresponding constraints from the attacker’s (primal)  
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problem.  Constraints (AD1) through (AD4) also follow from the dual of the inner 
problem in the attacker’s problem.  Constraints (A1) through (A3), unchanged from the 
attacker’s problem, ensure the attack plan is feasible.   
Based on the number of attacks allowed, the solution to the AD problem gives us 
the optimal attack locations.  From the eyes of an intelligent adversary with the intent of 
inflicting maximal damage, these attack locations reflect the components which are most 
attractive to attack.  Further, we can transfer this interdiction plan back to the original 
attacker’s problem and solve for the operator’s new best flow plan with the interdictions 
in place.  This yields insight into the resilience of our system.  We see exactly how the 
system responds and how effectively it absorbs the impact of the attack plan.  Looking at 
the increased cost in the objective function, we also see the relative damage associated 
with each attack plan.  Finally, by modifying the attacker’s capability over a range of 
values and analyzing the output, we determine the worst-case disruptions to system 
performance in regards to an increasing number of simultaneous attacks.  
B. DATA COLLECTION 
The data to support our model consists of two primary types: capacity and traffic 
demand.  Capacity values for all currently existing submarine cables are straight forward 
and readily available on public sources.  We focus primarily on the lit capacity of each 
cable system.  Lit capacity refers to the actual traffic-carrying capability of a cable based 
on what has been equipped to date.  Design or max capacity refers to the maximum 
traffic-carrying capability of a cable if it were fully equipped using today’s technology.  
Design capacity combines lit and unlit (or dark) capacity.           
The traffic demand between each pair of countries is considerably more difficult 
to quantify.  For competitive and privacy reasons, privately-owned undersea cable 
operators seldom provide historical records of the traffic volume on their cables.  
Additionally, there are many different metrics used to measure the flow of 
telecommunications traffic.  For our network model, we seek demand in bandwidth 
terms, namely Gbps.  The used bandwidth between two locations effectively represents 
the demand between those locations at a snapshot in time.  Obviously the used bandwidth 
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fluctuates throughout the day with spikes during normal business hours.  In practice, most 
network providers use the peak traffic demand over a given time period to represent used 
bandwidth since “a network that is able to accommodate the daily peak load will 
necessarily accommodate all demand at every other second of the day” (Terabit 
Consulting, 2002).   
We develop a gravity model to estimate international traffic flow between each 
pair of countries.  We are not concerned with domestic traffic.  On the other hand, we are 
concerned with both the inbound and outbound traffic for each country.  On a typical 
route, voice data only accounts for about one percent of the total demand (Szajowski, 
2010), so we focus our analysis on Internet traffic.  Our gravity model for traffic is a 
modified version of those developed by Nandi et al. (2000) and Chang et al. (2006).  As 
with Nandi et al. (2000), the flow of traffic among countries in our model is directly 
dependent on the number of Internet hosts in each country.  As the population of interest, 
the number of Internet hosts reasonably reflects the level of connectivity within each 
country along with the degree to which countries communicate with each other.  This 
measure also reflects the asymmetric nature of Internet traffic.  Countries with a small 
share of hosts relative to the Internet world receive more traffic than they send, while 
countries with a large share, such as the United States, send more traffic than they 
receive.  Additionally, these statistics are widely available in the public domain.  The 
number of Internet hosts for each country is listed in Appendix A and is assumed to be 
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From the total traffic across the network, equation (G0) computes the share that is 
associated with country s.  From the total traffic of country s, equation (G1) computes the 
share that is exchanged with country t.  Then, from the total traffic exchanged between 
Discussion 
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countries s and t, equation (G2) computes the share of traffic that travels from country s 
to country t.  Finally, equation (G3) computes the total flow of traffic that enters the 
network at node t.  We demonstrate our gravity model with an example.  For the total 
traffic across the network, we use 55 Tbps, an estimate of the international demand for 
Internet bandwidth in 2011 (Telegeography, 2011).  We use the list in Appendix A for 
the number of Internet hosts in each country.  The resulting traffic matrix, for a small 
sampling of countries, is shown in Table 2.  Since we define commodities in terms of 
their destinations, the negative values on the diagonals represent the demand of the 
commodity corresponding to that destination.  For example, USA has a demand of 
approximately 352 Gbps of the commodity “USA”.  Correspondingly, Australia has a 
supply of approximately 16 Gbps of the commodity “USA”, Brazil a supply of 
approximately 34 Gbps of the commodity “USA”, and so on.  The sum for each column 
in the traffic matrix then is equal to zero.       
 
 
USA Australia Brazil China Colombia France India Israel Japan Singapore UK 
USA -351.59 536.35 765.33 609.68 103.93 607.01 185.71 69.60 2016.74 40.97 286.21 
Australia 16.32 -631.98 9.94 8.97 2.68 8.95 4.26 1.89 13.53 1.16 5.80 
Brazil 33.67 14.37 -879.35 15.51 4.07 15.47 6.69 2.83 26.00 1.72 9.38 
China 21.18 10.23 12.25 -712.23 3.12 10.93 5.02 2.19 17.15 1.34 6.91 
Colombia 0.60 0.51 0.53 0.52 -131.52 0.52 0.39 0.24 0.58 0.17 0.44 
France 20.99 10.17 12.16 10.88 3.10 -709.33 5.00 2.17 17.01 1.33 6.87 
India 1.92 1.45 1.57 1.49 0.69 1.49 -230.82 0.53 1.79 0.35 1.18 
Israel 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.20 -88.87 0.26 0.10 0.22 
Japan 251.96 55.52 73.82 61.67 12.48 61.45 21.65 8.47 -2097.27 5.04 32.20 
Singapore 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.09 -52.76 0.08 
UK 4.58 3.05 3.41 3.19 1.23 3.18 1.83 0.90 4.13 0.58 -349.30 
Table 2.   Traffic matrix, based on 55 Tbps total traffic across the network, showing 
the demand for traffic, in Gbps, between a small sample of countries.  
C. NETWORK MODEL 
We model the real-world infrastructure explicitly.  We prefer a high-fidelity 
network model because that is where the value of rigorous optimization is often realized.  
As described by Brown et al. (2006), in the analysis of large infrastructure systems the 
most damaging, coordinated attacks are not always obvious, and the most effective 
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defenses are not necessarily intuitive.  A more detailed model also allows us to pinpoint 
the actual physical components that are most vulnerable which leads to recommendations 
that are specific and actionable. 
We model each undersea cable system as its own network.  All of these models 
taken together form the complete network.  This method allows us to add or remove 
individual cable systems as needed.  In addition to identifying all the existing cables 
worldwide along with their landing stations, we take special care in the configuration of 
each cable.  The exact network configuration of each cable system is unique.  While the 
logical topologies are almost always confidential, the physical topologies are readily 
available from a number of public sources in most cases.  As such, we match the arcs in 
our network model with the physical configurations available for each cable system.  We 
introduce our network modeling approach with a specific example of the abstraction of 
one undersea cable system into a network.   
The Flag Falcon Cable System connects numerous countries throughout Africa, 
the Middle East, and South Asia.  Incidentally, Flag Falcon was one of the cable systems 
cut during the widespread disruptions in early 2008.  Figure 6 shows an overall view of 




Figure 6.   Physical configuration of the Flag Falcon Cable System (Adapted from 
Telegeography, 2012b).     
 The Flag Falcon Cable System consists of a mix of branched string and ring 
configurations.  Starting in Egypt, Flag Falcon runs the length of the Red Sea and then 
along the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula with branches to several countries 
along the way.  The Persian Gulf section of the cable is a self-healing ring design with 
landing stations throughout the Gulf region.  Finally, another branched string travels from 
Oman to India with a branch to Iran.  There are 16 total landing stations in the cable 
system.  Figure 7 shows a portion of the Flag Falcon Cable System and depicts our 
network modeling approach.   
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Figure 7.   Network design showing a portion of the Flag Falcon Cable System (FFC) 
with nodes representing the country (red), landing stations (blue), and 
branching units (green) (Adapted from Telegeography, 2012b). 
 In our network design, each country involved in the cable system is represented 
by two nodes: an input node and an output node.  The input node receives the traffic 
destined for that country, while the output node sends out the traffic that is destined for 
other countries.  Each country’s input node is connected to its output node by a single 
directed edge.  The capacity on this edge is dependent on the terrestrial optical fiber cable 
infrastructure of the respective country.  For countries with well-developed terrestrial 
cable systems such as the United States, we assume the capacity on this directed edge is 
effectively unlimited.  For countries with limited terrestrial infrastructure, we assume the 
capacity is negligible.  In effect, this assumption determines whether traffic may travel 
across the terrestrial systems of a country to be passed along to other undersea cable 
systems.  In the example here, we assume the terrestrial cable infrastructure in Yemen is 
not sufficient to transfer traffic from one cable landing station in Yemen to the other 
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cable landing station in Yemen via terrestrial systems.  To indicate this assumption, we 
represent the zero-capacity directed edge from Yemen’s input node to its output node 
with the dotted line in Figure 7.  In addition to the terrestrial cable infrastructure within 
each country, we also consider the terrestrial infrastructure between countries which 
share a land boundary such as the United States and Canada.  When the terrestrial 
infrastructure between two countries is well-developed, we use a directed edge from the 
output node of one country to the input node of the other country and vice versa.  This 
assumption allows traffic to be sent between countries via terrestrial cable systems.  
Further in our network design, we represent each cable landing station by a pair of nodes: 
an interior node and an exterior node.  The landing station’s interior and exterior nodes 
are connected by dual edges in opposite directions with abundant capacity on each edge.  
An attack on these edges effectively represents an attack against the corresponding 
landing station.  Finally, each landing station is connected with its respective country 
with a directed edge from the landing station’s interior node to the country’s input node 
and another directed edge from the country’s output node to the landing station’s interior 
node.  We assume an abundant capacity on each of these edges as well.  In this manner, 
we create the network structure for all the countries and cable landing stations involved in 
the model.  The only remaining task is to abstract the cable systems themselves into our 
network. 
 Since undersea cable systems are designed on a fiber pair basis to support bi-
directional flow, the cable capacities represent the capacity for flow in either direction.  
As such, we represent each segment of a cable system with dual edges in opposite 
directions where each of the two edges has the given capacity of the respective cable.  
For each intersection in the physical configuration of a cable system, we assume that a 
branching unit supports that convergence.  We represent each branching unit with an 
artificial node as shown in Figure 7.  As a result, each segment of an undersea cable 
system starts and ends at either of two nodes: an exterior node of a cable landing station 
or an artificial node representing a branching unit.  In the case of a ring configuration as 
in the Persian Gulf section of Flag Falcon, each segment of the undersea cable starts and 
ends at the exterior node of the associated cable landing stations.   
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 Using the modeling technique described here, we construct the basis of our 
network including the nodes and edges for all countries and their associated landing 
stations.  Then we superimpose the graph of each individual cable system to create a 
complex network.  This modeling approach provides tremendous flexibility in regards to 
the specific scenarios of interest.  We analyze the flow of communications between 
specific countries or regions in the world by adding or removing the associated cable 
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IV. THE EUROPE TO INDIA MODEL 
In this section we demonstrate our network modeling technique for undersea 
cable infrastructure.  We analyze the flow of communications between Europe and India.  
While much of the attention during the undersea cable disruptions in early 2008 in the 
Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf focused on countries in the Middle East, India was 
actually the most heavily affected country.  India had over 2,000 network prefix outages 
during the disruptions, the highest number among all impacted countries (Zmijewski, 
2008).  And since many companies throughout Europe outsource call centers and other 
Internet related business to India, the disruptions created second order effects in the 
European economy as well.  While most of the major bandwidth from India heads east, 
there are only six undersea cable systems that connect India to Europe.  These six cable 
systems, along with the lit and maximum capacity for each, are listed in Table 3.  The 
capacities shown are assumed to be correct for this analysis.   
 
Cable System Lit Capacity (Gbps) Max Capacity (Gbps) 
FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 85 200 
FLAG Falcon 90 1280 
IMEWE 520 3840 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 100 1280 
SeaMeWe-3 90 960 
SeaMeWe-4 1350 1700 
Table 3.   The six undersea cable systems that connect Europe and India along with 
the capacity of each cable system. 
We include the six cable systems from Table 3 in our network model.  We use the 
physical configurations of these cable systems to construct their individual graphs by 
segment as shown in Appendix B.  In regards to traffic, we include all the countries 
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associated with these six cable systems except those countries to the east of India.  There 
are 35 total countries in the model.  We assume the total traffic across the network is 10 
Tbps.  Under this assumption, the system is near 100 percent operational utilization.  That 
is, under normal operating conditions the six cable systems, based on their lit capacity, 
effectively transmit all traffic with only a small amount of dropped flow.  We also 
assume that the European countries in this model, along with India and Egypt, have 
effectively unlimited terrestrial capacity.  As such, landing stations in these countries may 
pass transit traffic along to other landing stations within that same country.  Additionally, 
we assume that the European countries sharing land boundaries also have effectively 
unlimited capacity via terrestrial or other systems.  This assumption, in effect, allows the 
European countries to exchange traffic without using the six undersea cables in the 
model.  This last assumption is very important.  In practice, undersea cables are not often 
used when easier and less expensive transmission mediums exist.  The last assumption 
ensures the flows on the cables in our model closely resemble the actual flows that could 
be expected on the corresponding real-world cables in regards to the source and 
destination of the traffic.        
We use our model to analyze the flow of communications between Europe and 
India under three different scenarios.  For each of the three scenarios, we analyze the 
impact of up to 10 simultaneous interdictions to the system.  In this model, an interdiction 
corresponds to an attack or disruption against an undersea cable or cable landing station.  
We store the country data and cable system data in Microsoft Excel (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2012).  We use the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (GAMS, 
2010) to implement the mathematical model and solve utilizing CPLEX 12.02 (ILOG, 
2007).  Finally, we develop a custom Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2012) user interface for automated scenario generation.  The user interface 
generates the desired network model based on the selected countries and cable systems, 
computes the traffic between each pair of countries based on the gravity model, and runs 
the optimization in GAMS.   
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A. RESULTS 
The operator’s goal is to transmit the traffic demand for all 35 countries in the 
model without prejudice to any particular country or countries.  Similarly, the attacker 
seeks to maximize the damage to the overall system rather than target any particular 
country or countries.  In other words, the attacker does not care which countries suffer the 
greatest loss in telecommunications traffic but rather how much damage is inflicted on 
the system as a whole.  Within this broader context, our analysis focuses primarily on the 
traffic exchanged between Europe and India.  Figure 8 displays a cartoon diagram of the 
six cable systems in the Europe to India model.  This diagram shows the general routing 
configuration of each cable system.  Appendix B provides the exact routing 
configurations, including all landing stations, for each cable system.   
 
 
Figure 8.   Cartoon diagram of the Europe to India model. 
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Table 4 provides a summarized version of the traffic matrix aggregated by the 
four geographic regions from Figure 8.  This traffic matrix does not account for all of the 
traffic demand in this model.  In particular, the traffic demand between countries in the 
same region is not included.  We aggregate the traffic by region so we can focus on the 
traffic between Europe and India.  Appendix D provides the complete traffic matrix by 
country for the Europe to India model. 
 
 
Europe Africa Middle East India 
Europe -349.655 345.121 329.519 371.019 
Africa 104.862 -377.815 15.511 13.193 
Middle East 66.427 10.205 -367.924 8.501 
India 178.366 22.489 22.894 -392.713 
Table 4.   Traffic matrix, in Gbps, for the Europe to India model aggregated by 
geographic region 
1. Scenario One 
In the first scenario, we assume each cable system operates at lit capacity.  
Additionally, we do not allow interdictions against the cable landing stations.  Figure 9 
shows the operator’s resilience curve for scenario one.  This curve shows the amount of 
traffic that is dropped across the entire system at each level of interdiction.  Under normal 
conditions, with no interdictions, the system is not able to satisfy the total traffic demand.  
The amount of dropped traffic is approximately 400 Gbps.  However, none of the traffic 
demand between Europe and India is dropped.  Europe successfully sends approximately 
371 Gbps of traffic to India and receives approximately 178 Gbps of traffic from India.  
Further, all traffic demand between pairs of countries in the same region is also satisfied.  
Most of the dropped traffic in the no-interdiction case occurs between Europe and Africa 
with approximately 250 Gbps of dropped flow.  Traffic associated with the country of 
South Africa, either incoming or outgoing, accounts for almost half of that dropped flow 




relative to the amount of traffic demand associated with it.  Only one cable system, the 
SEACOM Tata/TGN-Eurasia, provides access to South Africa.  The consequence of too 
much demand along a specific route is dropped traffic.   
As we introduce interdictions to the system, the amount of dropped traffic 
increases by a similar amount, approximately 200 Gbps, for each additional interdiction 
up to the case of five interdictions.  Beyond five interdictions, the curve levels out with 
successive interdictions beyond that offering little additional value in terms of further 
degrading the system.  Further, India is completely isolated from Europe in the case of 
five interdictions, and hence most of the damage to the system is already accomplished at 
that level.   
 
 
Figure 9.   Operator’s resilience curve for scenario one. 
Figure 10 indicates which cables are interdicted along with the approximate 
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comprehensive list of these interdiction locations by the actual cable segment for each 
case up to ten interdictions.  In Figure 10, we see that the interdiction locations are not 
always nested; for example, the optimal attack location in the case of one interdiction is 
not included in the case of two interdictions.  The same is true going from four to five 
interdictions.  Figure 10 reveals another interesting observation.  Aside from the case of 
one interdiction, the optimal attack locations always occur between Europe and Africa in 
the Mediterranean Sea.  In the case of two, three, or four interdictions, these attack 
locations tend to be in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea or near the coast of Africa.  In 
the case of five interdictions, however, we observe the non-nested result.  All of the 
interdiction locations still lie in the Mediterranean Sea.  However, in this case the 
majority of attack locations lie near the coast of Europe rather than Africa.     
    
 
Figure 10.   Cartoon diagram for scenario one showing which cables are interdicted 
along with the approximate location of the disruptions. 
Figure 11 provides further analysis of the traffic dropped in scenario one.  This 
chart focuses specifically on the traffic associated with India both inbound and outbound.  
We already know that India is completely isolated from Europe with five or more 
simultaneous disruptions.  However, looking at Figure 11, India’s traffic is actually 
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severely degraded much sooner than that.  Figure 11 shows the percent loss in India’s 
traffic with all other countries in the model, not just those in Europe.  While India is 
fairly resilient in the case of one or two disruptions, almost 70 percent of the traffic 
destined for or coming out of India is lost with just three simultaneous disruptions.  
Strikingly, all of this loss to India’s communications traffic occurs without a single cable 
disruption at or near the actual coast of India.     
 
 
Figure 11.   Percent loss in the traffic associated with India in scenario one. 
2. Scenario Two 
In scenario two we assume each cable system operates at maximum capacity 
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cable landing stations.  Analyzing the model using the maximum capacity of the cables 
allows us to see the effect of this redundant capacity.  In Figure 12, we compare the 
operator’s resilience curves for scenarios one and two.  The first difference we notice 
between scenarios one and two occurs when the system is operating under normal, ideal 
conditions with no interdictions.   
 
 
Figure 12.   Operator’s resilience curves for scenarios one and two 
In scenario one when the cable systems operate at lit capacity, the system is not 
able to satisfy the total traffic demand.  The amount of traffic dropped is approximately 
400 Gbps.  However, in scenario two when the cable systems operate at maximum 
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13 displays the operational utilization on each segment of one of the cable systems in our 
model, the SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia, under normal operating conditions with no 
interdictions.  In scenario one, most of the segments in this cable system are at or near 
100 percent operational utilization.  Meanwhile in scenario two, most of the segments are 
around just 30 percent operational utilization. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Operational utilization by segment of the SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 
cable system under normal conditions with no interdictions 
With the additional capacity provided in scenario two, the system is also more 
resilient to disruption for cases up to four interdictions as we might expect.  However, in 
the case of five or more interdictions, the operator’s resilience curves are identical for 
scenarios one and two.  In both scenarios, all of the cables entering Europe are disrupted 
for these cases.  As a result, traffic cannot be re-routed into or out of Europe via excess 
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scenario two is beneficial for small numbers of disruptions, this redundant capacity offers 
no help in the case of larger numbers of simultaneous disruptions.  And as in scenario 
one, India is still isolated from Europe in the case of five or more interdictions.    
Looking back at the operator’s resilience curves in Figure 12, the total amount of 
dropped traffic across the entire system appears only slightly improved for scenario two 
versus scenario one.  However, a closer look at the traffic associated specifically with 
India reveals significant improvement under scenario two.  As shown in Figure 14, under 
scenario two the system is extremely resilient up to three interdictions in regards to the 
traffic associated with India.  Whereas India experiences nearly 70 percent loss in traffic 
in scenario one in the case of three simultaneous disruptions, the loss to India is less than 




Figure 14.   Percent loss in the traffic associated with India for scenarios one and two 
Figure 15 indicates which cables are interdicted along with the approximate 
location of the disruptions for each case up to five interdictions for scenario two.  As with 
scenario one, Appendix C provides a comprehensive list of interdiction locations for each 
case up to ten interdictions.  In Figure 15, the interdiction locations between successive 
cases are always nested with one exception.  Going from three interdictions to four 
interdictions, we see the non-nested result.  In fact, none of the attack locations from the 
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Figure 15.   Cartoon diagram for scenario two showing which cables are interdicted 
along with the approximate location of the disruptions 
3. Scenario Three 
In the third and final scenario, we assume each cable system operates at lit 
capacity as in scenario one.  However, in this scenario we allow interdictions against the 
cable landing stations in addition to interdictions against the cables themselves.  The 
operator’s resilience curves for all three scenarios are compared in Figure 16.  As we 
might expect, the system is significantly less resilient to disruption in scenario three 
where we allow interdictions against cable landing stations.  In the case of one, two, or 
three interdictions, the total traffic that is dropped is significantly higher in scenario three 
compared to scenario one.  Additionally, in scenario three India is isolated from Europe 
with just two simultaneous interdictions compared with the five interdictions required in 




Figure 16.   Operator’s resilience curves for all scenarios. 
As shown in Figure 17, the interdiction locations for scenario three are not nested 
going from one to two interdictions and also from two to three interdictions.  In the case 
of one interdiction, the worst-case disruption occurs at the cable landing station in 
Marseille, France.  Since three of the six cables in this model utilize this landing station 
as an entry point to Europe, the total amount of dropped traffic in scenario three is almost 
double that of scenario one for the case of one interdiction.  In the case of two 
interdictions, the worst-case disruptions still occur at cable landing stations but here the 
landing stations lie along Egypt’s Red Sea coast.  Although not clearly evident from the 
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India to Europe enter Egypt at one of these two cable landing stations.  As a result, India 
is completely isolated from Europe with only the two interdictions.  As with the first two 
scenarios, Appendix C provides the comprehensive list of interdiction locations for each 
case up to ten interdictions for scenario three.   
 
 
Figure 17.   Cartoon diagram for scenario three showing which cables or landing 
stations are interdicted along with the approximate location of the 
disruptions. 
In Figure 18, we again focus specifically on the traffic associated with India.  In 
this figure, we compare the percent loss in Indian traffic, both inbound and outbound, 
across all three scenarios.  As expected, scenario three produces the most catastrophic 
results.  Even with just one interdiction, India loses over 65 percent of its total traffic.  
And again, we note from Figure 17 that these devastating losses occur without an actual 
attack at or near the coast of India.  In fact, we do not see an attack at or near India until 
the case of seven interdictions.  And in this case, India is completely isolated from all the 
other countries in the model not just those in Europe.  Another interesting observation 
from Figure 18 occurs in the jump from two interdictions to three interdictions.  Recall 
that the goal of the attacker is to inflict maximal damage on the system as a whole.  
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Indeed, the damage to the system in scenario three increases going from two to three 
interdictions as shown in the operator’s resilience curve back in Figure 16.   However, the 
damage to India actually decreases from two to three interdictions as shown in Figure 18.  
A closer look at the attack locations for scenario three in Appendix C reveals the reason 
for this decrease in damage to India.  As mentioned previously, the worst-case 
disruptions in the two-interdiction case in scenario three both occur at landing stations on 
the Red Sea coast of Egypt.  Since each of the cables travelling from India to Europe go 
through one of these two landing stations, India is isolated from Europe in this case.  
Furthermore, India is also isolated from all the non-European countries whose only 
access to undersea cables lies on the Mediterranean Sea.  So in addition to being isolated 
from Europe, India is also isolated from Turkey, another country with relatively strong 
traffic demand.  However, going from two to three interdictions we see another non-
nested result as the landing stations in Egypt are no longer attacked.  In the three-
interdiction case, the worst-case disruptions switch back to the European coast.  And 
while India is still cut off from Europe, the traffic demand between India and Turkey is 
satisfied in this case.  As a result, we see the small decrease in the damage specifically to 
India going from two to three interdictions.   
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Figure 18.   Percent loss in the traffic associated with India across all scenarios. 
Table 5 provides additional insight into which of the six cables are targeted the 
most in this model.  The SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia and SeaMeWe-3 cable systems 
are the most consistently interdicted cables across all three scenarios.  At first glance, this 
result is somewhat counterintuitive given that these two cables are not the largest 
capacity cables in this model.  In fact, the SeaMeWe-4 and IMEWE cable systems both 
have much larger capacities and hence would seem the more attractive choices for 
interdiction.  The physical configurations of the cables in Appendix B provide insight 
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systems each have only two landing stations in Europe, the SeaMeWe-3 has seven 
landing stations in Europe.  The physical redundancy afforded by this routing makes the 
SeaMeWe-3 more resilient to interdictions but also more attractive for interdiction at 
multiple locations.  In all three scenarios, the SeaMeWe-3 cable system is attacked at 
more locations than any other cable.  Meanwhile, the SeaMeWe-4 and IMEWE cable 
systems are almost always attacked just one time and in the same location each time.  
Their physical configurations present a single point of failure whereby the entire cable 
system is severely degraded with just one interdiction.  The SeaMeWe-3 cable system, on 
the other hand, must be attacked at multiple different locations in order to inflict maximal 
damage.  Physical redundancy, in the form of both path diversity and landing station 
diversity, allows cables to function effectively even after disruptions.     
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Table 5.   Frequency of interdiction by cable or landing station across all scenarios 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Our primary goal in this thesis is to provide a network modeling technique for 
analyzing resilience in the global undersea cable infrastructure.  This technique can be 
applied at the microscopic level with just one or two cables and a few countries up to the 
macroscopic level with all the undersea cables and countries in the world.  Our analysis 
of Europe to India traffic in the previous section demonstrates our technique.  The results 
and analysis from this model also provide significant insight into the undersea cable 
infrastructure connecting Europe and India and still broader implications regarding 
undersea cable infrastructures in general.    
First, as with India in our analysis, a country’s ability to send and receive 
transoceanic communications may be severely degraded without disruptions to any cables 
or landing stations that are actually in or near that country.  Such is the nature of undersea 
cables, and indeed the primary difficulty that countries face in protecting their undersea 
cable interests.  Often, those interests stretch well beyond their own territorial boundaries.       
The second major insight from our model and analysis is the importance of 
redundancy.  In our model, adding redundancy enhances the resilience of the Europe to 
India cable infrastructure.  And while this result merely validates what is already 
intuitively known about undersea cables, our model further demonstrates a more specific 
result regarding redundancy.  In order to ensure the resilience of the infrastructure across 
all levels of disruptions, redundancy must exist in the form of both capacity redundancy 
and physical redundancy.  In scenario two in our model, the additional capacity made 
available in the already existing cables significantly enhances the resilience of the system 
in the cases of three or fewer simultaneous disruptions; this capacity redundancy provides 
tremendous flexibility for re-routing traffic along other cables with minimal traffic loss.  
Of course capacity redundancy also provides adequate margins for future growth along 
major geographic routes such as the route from Europe to India.  But capacity 
redundancy alone is not enough.  In the face of larger scale simultaneous disruptions, 
physical redundancy is similarly vital.  In the case of five or more simultaneous 
disruptions, we show that capacity redundancy is useless without physical redundancy.  
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Furthermore, physical redundancy must exist in multiple forms.  Path diversity in the 
routing of cable systems, such as with the SeaMeWe-3 cable system in our model, allows 
cables to effectively handle disruptions and ensures that no physical or logical single 
points of interdiction exist.  Landing station diversity is just as critical.  As we 
demonstrate in scenario three, landing stations that host multiple undersea cables are 
particularly vulnerable.  Since all of the cables entering Egypt via the Red Sea coast share 
one of two landing stations, interdictions against these two landing stations result in 
massive traffic loss in our model.   
Finally, our model demonstrates that geography plays an important role.  For any 
sea-bound commodity exchanged between Europe and India, the passage through Egypt 
from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea is a natural choke point.  The same is true 
with undersea cables.  In our model, more than half of all interdictions across the first two 
scenarios occur at cable segments at or near the Egyptian coastline.  So along with the 
landing stations in Egypt, the cable segments adjoined to Egypt are similarly vulnerable.  
Further, because of its geographic area, the Mediterranean Sea is naturally more 
congested with undersea cables than is the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans.  As a result, 
destructive events, whether natural or man-made, are more likely to affect multiple 
cables.  Unfortunately, as demonstrated across all the scenarios in our model, the Europe 
to India undersea cable infrastructure is not at all resilient to five or more simultaneous 
disruptions when those disruptions occur at key locations.   
This research is a small example of the analysis on the global undersea cable 
infrastructure that can be undertaken with our network modeling technique.  Our results 
are derived from data we collected through open sources.  While we assume the data used 
here is correct, the model could easily be updated to incorporate known or measured data 
from the actual proprietary sources.  Examples of this kind of data include the cable 
capacities, precise logical and physical configurations of the cables, along with historic or 
projected traffic demands along specified routes.  This model could easily be adapted to 
address scenarios of interest to the Department of Defense by including specific cable 
systems and adjusting shortage costs to prioritize certain kinds of traffic. 
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Future research might also incorporate terrestrial cable systems to more accurately 
reflect the overall level of connectivity among countries and regions.  Further, our model 
assumes the cost of carrying traffic is identical for each cable system.  With more 
accurate data on the cost of carrying traffic along the different cables, further research 
could expand our model from simply a resilience approach to an economic or consumer 
goal model.  As an example, consider a communications carrier that wants to lease 
capacity along a particular route based on their projected traffic demand.  The model, 
then, is modified to optimally determine the cables and quantity of capacity on each cable 
that minimize cost.  Another factor we do not consider in this research is the length of 
repair time associated with a particular disruption.  As an improvement to our model, 
future work might account for variable length repair times for each disruption event 
based on historical data.  This would allow for a better understanding of the economic 
losses over time that result from different levels of disruptions.  In conclusion, the 
complex and rapidly evolving infrastructure of undersea cables offers countless 
possibilities for future research and analysis.  We hope the network modeling technique 
described herein serves as a step forward in those endeavors.     
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APPENDIX A:  INTERNET HOSTS BY COUNTRY 
RANK COUNTRY INTERNET HOSTS 
1 United States 498,000,000 
2 Japan 63,466,000 
3 Italy 25,456,000 
4 Brazil 23,790,000 
5 Germany 20,416,000 
6 China 19,772,000 
7 Australia 16,952,000 
8 France 16,872,880 
9 Mexico 15,165,000 
10 Russia 13,758,000 
11 Netherlands 13,715,000 
12 Poland 12,928,000 
13 Argentina 10,928,000 
14 Canada 8,515,000 
15 United Kingdom 8,409,000 
16 India 6,738,000 
17 Taiwan 6,166,000 
18 Sweden 5,727,000 
19 Switzerland 5,249,000 
20 Belgium 5,180,000 
21 South Africa 4,835,000 
22 Finland 4,700,000 
23 Denmark 4,285,000 
24 Colombia 4,281,000 
25 Spain 4,232,000 
26 Czech Republic 4,140,000 
27 Portugal 3,664,000 
28 Turkey 3,625,000 
29 Norway 3,584,000 
30 Austria 3,445,000 
31 Thailand 3,278,000 
32 Greece 3,115,000 
33 Hungary 3,064,000 
34 New Zealand 3,028,000 
35 Romania 2,702,000 
36 Israel 2,179,000 
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RANK COUNTRY INTERNET HOSTS 
37 Ukraine 1,997,000 
38 Singapore 1,932,000 
39 Chile 1,854,000 
40 Slovakia 1,387,000 
41 Ireland 1,380,000 
42 Indonesia 1,342,000 
43 Lithuania 1,184,000 
44 Serbia 1,102,000 
45 Uruguay 945,826 
46 Bulgaria 937,195 
47 Venezuela 888,028 
48 Hong Kong 861,516 
49 Estonia 848,009 
50 Croatia 725,521 
51 Moldova 696,685 
52 Philippines 452,050 
53 Slovenia 417,984 
54 Dominican Republic 404,057 
55 United Arab Emirates 371,969 
56 Malaysia 363,007 
57 Iceland 360,910 
58 Georgia 358,109 
59 Guatemala 346,834 
60 Pakistan 340,834 
61 Latvia 315,889 
62 Belarus 302,560 
63 Korea, South 293,862 
64 Paraguay 278,473 
65 Morocco 278,075 
66 Luxembourg 253,959 
67 Cyprus 252,990 
68 Trinidad and Tobago 241,640 
69 Peru 232,515 
70 Egypt 200,336 
71 Armenia 192,541 
72 Nicaragua 176,985 
73 Vietnam 175,612 
74 Bolivia 167,769 
75 Iran 167,453 
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RANK COUNTRY INTERNET HOSTS 
76 Ecuador 162,281 
77 Saudi Arabia 147,202 
78 Costa Rica 146,164 
79 Bosnia and Herzegovina 146,152 
80 Tuvalu 138,579 
81 Kyrgyzstan 116,586 
82 Mozambique 82,804 
83 Niue 78,927 
84 Namibia 77,948 
85 Turks and Caicos Islands 72,591 
86 Kenya 69,914 
87 Bangladesh 69,285 
88 Kazakhstan 65,988 
89 Lebanon 64,525 
90 Macedonia 62,718 
91 Ghana 60,282 
92 Cocos (Keeling) Islands 58,130 
93 Uzbekistan 56,334 
94 British Indian Ocean Territory 54,452 
95 Mauritius 51,123 
96 Brunei 49,403 
97 Jordan 49,083 
98 Bahrain 46,035 
99 Nepal 41,532 
100 Aruba 40,894 
101 French Polynesia 37,360 
102 New Caledonia 33,904 
103 Yemen 33,279 
104 Uganda 33,082 
105 Madagascar 32,537 
106 Zimbabwe 30,650 
107 Azerbaijan 29,968 
108 Andorra 28,131 
109 Honduras 27,074 
110 Tanzania 25,832 
111 Monaco 25,674 
112 Guyana 24,840 
113 Cayman Islands 23,079 
114 Fiji 22,754 
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RANK COUNTRY INTERNET HOSTS 
115 El Salvador 22,372 
116 Mongolia 20,865 
117 Tonga 20,766 
118 Bahamas, The 20,674 
119 Bermuda 20,527 
120 Angola 20,269 
121 Samoa 18,074 
122 Libya 17,787 
123 Zambia 16,372 
124 Greenland 15,639 
125 Albania 15,505 
126 Bhutan 14,714 
127 Malta 14,687 
128 Cambodia 13,768 
129 Oman 13,488 
130 Antigua and Barbuda 11,844 
131 San Marino 11,097 
132 Panama 10,984 
133 Liechtenstein 9,969 
134 Montenegro 9,915 
135 Cameroon 9,553 
136 Sri Lanka 8,652 
137 Cote d'Ivoire 8,598 
138 Nauru 8,161 
139 Antarctica 7,763 
140 Faroe Islands 7,595 
141 Belize 7,464 
142 Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha 6,724 
143 Vanuatu 5,656 
144 Virgin Islands 4,876 
145 Papua New Guinea 4,847 
146 Micronesia, Federated States of 4,638 
147 Solomon Islands 4,354 
148 Tajikistan 4,268 
149 Jamaica 3,897 
150 Cook Islands 3,565 
151 Gibraltar 3,445 
152 Christmas Island 3,265 
153 Cuba 3,196 
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RANK COUNTRY INTERNET HOSTS 
154 Maldives 3,054 
155 Wallis and Futuna 2,750 
156 Kuwait 2,730 
157 Swaziland 2,706 
158 Botswana 2,674 
159 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 2,514 
160 Montserrat 2,470 
161 American Samoa 2,368 
162 Burkina Faso 1,833 
163 Sao Tome and Principe 1,646 
164 Lesotho 1,581 
165 Tokelau 1,550 
166 Laos 1,526 
167 Barbados 1,522 
168 Rwanda 1,277 
169 Togo 1,165 
170 Malawi 1,092 
171 Burma 1,033 
172 Nigeria 936 
173 Qatar 887 
174 Isle of Man 881 
175 Eritrea 870 
176 Dominica 722 
177 Turkmenistan 717 
178 Tunisia 575 
179 Algeria 561 
180 Haiti 541 
181 British Virgin Islands 505 
182 Benin 495 
183 Gambia, The 491 
184 Puerto Rico 458 
185 South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands 441 
186 Mali 438 
187 Syria 420 
188 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 336 
189 Kiribati 328 
190 Macau 284 
191 Anguilla 283 
192 Sierra Leone 280 
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RANK COUNTRY INTERNET HOSTS 
193 Jersey 255 
194 Seychelles 238 
195 Burundi 236 
196 Niger 229 
197 Guernsey 224 
198 Senegal 217 
199 Timor-Leste 210 
200 Djibouti 209 
201 Suriname 186 
202 Ethiopia 167 
203 Afghanistan 121 
204 Norfolk Island 120 
205 Somalia 113 
206 Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) 111 
207 Gabon 103 
208 Holy See (Vatican City) 102 
209 Saint Lucia 90 
210 Sudan 90 
211 Guinea-Bissau 86 
212 Grenada 71 
213 Saint Kitts and Nevis 52 
214 Congo, Republic of the 43 
215 French Southern and Antarctic Lands 34 
216 Cape Verde 31 
217 Mauritania 28 
218 Pitcairn Islands 27 
219 Iraq 23 
220 Central African Republic 20 
221 Northern Mariana Islands 17 
222 Comoros 15 
223 Guinea 15 
224 Liberia 7 
225 Korea, North 7 
226 Equatorial Guinea 7 
227 Bouvet Island 6 
228 Chad 5 
229 Palau 4 
230 Marshall Islands 3 
231 Saint Pierre and Miquelon 2 
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APPENDIX B:  PHYSICAL CONFIGURATIONS AND SEGMENTS 
OF THE UNDERSEA CABLES IN THE EUROPE TO INDIA MODEL 









1 Porthcurno, UK Estepona, Spain 85 200 
2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 85 200 
3 Palermo, Sicily Alexandria, Egypt 85 200 
4 Alexandria, Egypt Port Said, Egypt 85 200 
5 Suez, Egypt Branching Unit 1 85 200 
6 Al Aqabah, Jordan Branching Unit 1 85 200 
7 Branching Unit 1 Branching Unit 2 85 200 
8 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Branching Unit 2 85 200 
9 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 85 200 
10 Fujairah, UAE Branching Unit 3 85 200 
11 Branching Unit 3 Mumbai, India 85 200 
12 Mumbai, India Branching Unit 4 85 200 
13 Branching Unit 4 Penang, Malaysia 85 200 
14 Branching Unit 4 Satun, Thailand 85 200 
15 Satun, Thailand Songkhla, Thailand 85 200 
16 Songkhla, Thailand Lantau Island, Hong Kong 85 200 
17 Lantau Island, Hong Kong Shanghai, China 85 200 
18 Shanghai, China Keoje, South Korea 85 200 
19 Keoje, South Korea Branching Unit 5 85 200 
20 Branching Unit 5 Ninomiya, Japan 85 200 
21 Branching Unit 5 Miura, Japan 85 200 
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1 Suez, Egypt Branching Unit 1 90 1280 
2 Al Aqabah, Jordan Branching Unit 1 90 1280 
3 Branching Unit 1 Branching Unit 2 90 1280 
4 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Branching Unit 2 90 1280 
5 Port Sudan, Sudan Branching Unit 2 90 1280 
6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 90 1280 
7 Al Hudaydah, Yemen Branching Unit 3 90 1280 
8 Branching Unit 3 Branching Unit 4 90 1280 
9 Al Ghaydah, Yemen Branching Unit 4 90 1280 
10 Branching Unit 4 Al Seeb, Oman 90 1280 
11 Al Seeb, Oman Branching Unit 5 90 1280 
12 Chabahar, Iran Branching Unit 5 90 1280 
13 Branching Unit 5 Mumbai, India 90 1280 
14 Al Seeb, Oman Khasab, Oman 90 1280 
15 Khasab, Oman Dubai, UAE 90 1280 
16 Dubai, UAE Doha, Qatar 90 1280 
17 Doha, Qatar Manama, Bahrain 90 1280 
18 Manama, Bahrain Al Khubar, Saudi Arabia 90 1280 
19 Al Khubar, Saudi Arabia Kuwait City, Kuwait 90 1280 
20 Kuwait City, Kuwait Bandar Abbas, Iran 90 1280 













1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 520 3840 
2 Catania, Sicily Branching Unit 1 520 3840 
3 Branching Unit 1 Alexandria, Egypt 520 3840 
4 Alexandria, Egypt Tripoli, Lebanon 520 3840 
5 Suez, Egypt Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 520 3840 
6 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Branching Unit 2 520 3840 
7 Fujairah, UAE Branching Unit 2 520 3840 
8 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 520 3840 
9 Karachi, Pakistan Branching Unit 3 520 3840 
10 Mumbai, India Branching Unit 3 520 3840 
 
 










1 Marseille, France Sidi Kerir, Egypt 100 1280 
2 Ras Sidr, Egypt Branching Unit 1 100 1280 
3 Djibouti City, Djibouti Branching Unit 1 100 1280 
4 Branching Unit 1 Branching Unit 2 100 1280 
5 Branching Unit 2 Mumbai, India 100 1280 
6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 100 1280 
7 Mombasa, Kenya Branching Unit 3 100 1280 
8 Branching Unit 3 Branching Unit 4 100 1280 
9 Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Branching Unit 4 100 1280 
10 Branching Unit 4 Branching Unit 5 100 1280 
11 Toliary, Madagascar Branching Unit 5 100 1280 
12 Branching Unit 5 Branching Unit 6 100 1280 
13 Maputo, Mozambique Branching Unit 6 100 1280 
14 Mtunzini, South Africa Branching Unit 6 100 1280 
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1 Norden, Germany Branching Unit 1 90 960 
2 Ostend, Belgium Branching Unit 1 90 960 
3 Branching Unit 1 Branching Unit 2 90 960 
4 Goonhilly Downs, UK Branching Unit 2 90 960 
5 Branching Unit 2 Penmarch, France 90 960 
6 Penmarch, France Sesimbra, Portugal 90 960 
7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 90 960 
8 Tetouan, Morocco Branching Unit 3 90 960 
9 Branching Unit 3 Branching Unit 4 90 960 
10 Mazara del Vallo, Sicily Branching Unit 4 90 960 
11 Branching Unit 4 Branching Unit 5 90 960 
12 Chania, Crete Branching Unit 5 90 960 
13 Branching Unit 5 Branching Unit 6 90 960 
14 Marmaris, Turkey Branching Unit 6 90 960 
15 Branching Unit 6 Branching Unit 7 90 960 
16 Yeroskipos, Cyprus Branching Unit 7 90 960 
17 Branching Unit 7 Alexandria, Egypt 90 960 
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18 Suez, Egypt Branching Unit 8 90 960 
19 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Branching Unit 8 90 960 
20 Branching Unit 8 Djibouti City, Djibouti 90 960 
21 Djibouti City, Djibouti Branching Unit 9 90 960 
22 Branching Unit 9 Branching Unit 10 90 960 
23 Muscat, Oman Branching Unit 10 90 960 
24 Fujairah, UAE Branching Unit 10 90 960 
25 Branching Unit 9 Branching Unit 11 90 960 
26 Karachi, Pakistan Branching Unit 11 90 960 
27 Branching Unit 11 Mumbai, India 90 960 
28 Mumbai, India Branching Unit 12 90 960 
29 Cochin, India Branching Unit 12 90 960 
30 Branching Unit 12 Branching Unit 13 90 960 
31 Mount Lavinia, Sri Lanka Branching Unit 13 90 960 
32 Branching Unit 13 Branching Unit 14 90 960 
33 Pyapon, Myanmar Branching Unit 14 90 960 
34 Branching Unit 14 Branching Unit 15 90 960 
35 Satun, Thailand Branching Unit 15 90 960 
36 Branching Unit 15 Branching Unit 16 90 960 
37 Penang, Malaysia Branching Unit 16 90 960 
38 Branching Unit 16 Branching Unit 17 90 960 
39 Medan, Indonesia Branching Unit 17 90 960 
40 Branching Unit 17 Branching Unit 18 90 960 
41 Mersing, Malaysia Branching Unit 18 90 960 
42 Branching Unit 18 Tuas, Singapore 90 960 
43 Tuas, Singapore Branching Unit 19 90 960 
44 Branching Unit 19 Branching Unit 20 90 960 
45 Jakarta, Indonesia Branching Unit 20 90 960 
46 Perth, Australia Branching Unit 20 90 960 
47 Branching Unit 20 Branching Unit 21 90 960 
48 Danang, Vietnam Branching Unit 21 90 960 
49 Branching Unit 21 Branching Unit 22 90 960 
50 Tungku Beach, Brunei Branching Unit 22 90 960 
51 Branching Unit 22 Branching Unit 23 90 960 
52 Taipa, Macao Branching Unit 23 90 960 
53 Branching Unit 23 Branching Unit 24 90 960 
54 Batangas Bay, Philippines Branching Unit 24 90 960 
55 Branching Unit 24 Branching Unit 25 90 960 
 69 





56 Deep Water Bay, Hong Kong Branching Unit 25 90 960 
57 Branching Unit 25 Branching Unit 26 90 960 
58 Fangshan, Taiwan Branching Unit 26 90 960 
59 Branching Unit 26 Branching Unit 27 90 960 
60 Shantou, China Branching Unit 27 90 960 
61 Branching Unit 27 Branching Unit 28 90 960 
62 Shanghai, China Branching Unit 28 90 960 
63 Toucheng, Taiwan Branching Unit 28 90 960 
64 Branching Unit 28 Branching Unit 29 90 960 
65 Okinawa Branching Unit 29 90 960 
66 Keoje, South Korea Branching Unit 29 90 960 
 
 













1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 1350 1700 
2 Annaba, Algeria Branching Unit 1 1350 1700 
3 Branching Unit 1 Branching Unit 2 1350 1700 
4 Branching Unit 2 Bizerte, Tunisia 1350 1700 
5 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 1350 1700 
6 Branching Unit 3 Palermo, Sicily 1350 1700 
7 Branching Unit 3 Alexandria, Egypt 1350 1700 
8 Suez, Egypt Branching Unit 4 1350 1700 
9 Branching Unit 4 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 1350 1700 
10 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Branching Unit 5 1350 1700 
11 Fujairah, UAE Branching Unit 5 1350 1700 
12 Branching Unit 5 Branching Unit 6 1350 1700 
13 Karachi, Pakistan Branching Unit 6 1350 1700 
14 Branching Unit 6 Mumbai, India 1350 1700 
15 Mumbai, India Branching Unit 7 1350 1700 
16 Colombo, Sri Lanka Branching Unit 7 1350 1700 
17 Branching Unit 7 Chennai, India 1350 1700 
18 Chennai, India Branching Unit 8 1350 1700 
19 Coxs Bazar, Bangladesh Branching Unit 8 1350 1700 
20 Branching Unit 8 Branching Unit 9 1350 1700 
21 Satun, Thailand Branching Unit 9 1350 1700 
22 Branching Unit 9 Branching Unit 10 1350 1700 
23 Melaka, Malaysia Branching Unit 10 1350 1700 








APPENDIX C:  INTERDICTION LOCATIONS BY SEGMENT FOR 
EACH SCENARIO IN THE EUROPE TO INDIA MODEL 
SCENARIO 1 
  
Location of Interdiction 
Num 
Interdictions Cable Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
1 SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
2 IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
3 IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
4 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
5 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-4 1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 
6 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-4 1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 
7 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
8 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 




Location of Interdiction 
Num 
Interdictions Cable Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmais, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
9 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 13 Branching Unit 5 Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmais, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 16 Yeroskipos, Cyprus Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
10 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
FLAG FALCON 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
FLAG FALCON 13 Mumbai, India Branching Unit 5 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmais, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 






Location of Interdiction 
Num 
Interdictions Cable Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
1 SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
2 SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
3 SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 8 Tetouan, Morocco Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
4 IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 




Location of Interdiction 
Num 
Interdictions Cable Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
 
SeaMeWe-4 1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 
5 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-4 1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 
6 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-4 1 Marseille, France Branching Unit 1 
7 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
8 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 
9 FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA) 3 Alexandria, Egypt Palermo, Sicily 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 16 Yeroskipos, Cyprus Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 
SeaMeWe-4 7 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 3 




Location of Interdiction 
Num 
Interdictions Cable Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
 
FLAG Falcon 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
FLAG Falcon 13 Mumbai, India Branching Unit 5 
 
IMEWE 3 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 1 Sidi Kerir, Egypt Marseille, France 
 
SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasia 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris, Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 





   




(Cable or LS) 
Cable or LS Name Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
1 LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
2 LS Ras Sidr, Egypt n/a Ras Sidr, Egypt Ras Sidr, Egypt 
 
LS Suez, Egypt n/a Suez, Egypt Suez, Egypt 
3 Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
4 Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
Cable SEACOM 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
5 Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
Cable SEACOM 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
6 Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
Cable SEACOM 6 Branching Unit 2 Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris,Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
7 LS Chennai, India n/a Chennai, India Chennai, India 
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SCENARIO 3 
   




(Cable or LS) 
Cable or LS Name Segment End Point 1 End Point 2 
 
Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
LS Mumbai, India n/a Mumbai, India Mumbai, India 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris,Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 29 Cochin,India Branch Unit 12 
8 LS Chennai, India n/a Chennai, India Chennai, India 
 
Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
LS Mumbai, India n/a Mumbai, India Mumbai, India 
 
Cable SEACOM 14 Mtunzini, S. Africa Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris,Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 29 Cochin, India Branch Unit 12 
9 LS Chennai, India n/a Chennai, India Chennai, India 
 
Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
LS Mumbai, India n/a Mumbai, India Mumbai, India 
 
Cable SEACOM 14 Mtunzini, S. Africa Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris,Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 17 Alexandria, Egypt Branching Unit 7 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 29 Cochin,India Branch Unit 12 
10 LS Chennai, India n/a Chennai, India Chennai, India 
 
Cable FLAG Europe-Asia 2 Estepona, Spain Palermo, Sicily 
 
LS Marseille, France n/a Marseille, France Marseille, France 
 
LS Mumbai, India n/a Mumbai, India Mumbai, India 
 
Cable SEACOM 2 Ras Sidr, Egypt Branching Unit 1 
 
Cable SEACOM 14 Mtunzini, S. Africa Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 7 Sesimbra, Portugal Branching Unit 3 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 14 Marmaris,Turkey Branching Unit 6 
 
Cable SeaMeWe-3 29 Cochin,India Branch Unit 12 
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